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Scenario One
Guy walks into his banker’s office, sits down and
announces “You know, don’t you, that I haven’t a snowflake’s chance
of repaying all the money I have borrowed from you over the years?”
“What,” gasps the banker in horror, “you came all the
way down here to tell me that!”
“Not at all,” replies the customer calmly, “I came down
here to discuss the terms of a new loan.”
Scenario Two
Greek guy walks into a negotiating room in Brussels . . .
*

*

*

*

Financial wardship
As of this writing, Greece has embarked on its third official sector
bailout package in five years. The total amount already borrowed under these
packages, excluding the financial assistance provided to the Greek banks by the
European Central Bank, already approaches €246 billion. The latest program, if fully
implemented, could add as much as another €86 billion. Greece faces the very real
prospect of being the financial ward of its official sector sponsors (the European
Union and the International Monetary Fund) for the whole of this decade.
Two things have changed over the last five years. First, Greece’s
economy has contracted painfully as a result of the fiscal adjustment measures upon
which continued official sector assistance has been conditioned. The social and
political backlash in Greece is perfectly visible. Second, the sheer size of Greece’s
public sector debt burden -- now in excess of 176% of GDP -- is widely recognized
as unsustainable. Although the maturities of these loans have quietly been extended
for decades into the future, and the interest rate reduced substantially, even the IMF
has recently called for further debt relief including a possible write-down of the
nominal amount due to official sector lenders apart, naturally, from amounts due to
the IMF itself. Discussing massive new loans while simultaneously asking for a
write off of the old loans extended by the same group of creditors will test the skills
of any debt negotiator.
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Both Greece and its official sector sponsors should wish to end this
financial wardship. For Greece, it is a matter of pride and a sense that the country is
regaining some control of its financial destiny. For the official sector, pouring in
additional money while openly discussing the forgiveness of a portion of the moneyalready-poured-in poses an obvious political problem. The question is how. Greece
will certainly need to borrow. If that money does not come from official sector
sources, it must come from the private sector. But commercial lenders will be leery
of extending new credit to Greece for so long as the risk of a Greek exit from the
Eurozone is present. Private creditors will also naturally worry about lending new
money to a country carrying a colossal and unsustainable stock of existing debt.
Last spring, when Grexit fears temporarily subsided, Greece was able
to borrow in the international bond markets at an annual interest rate of less than 5%.
The market’s logic was that by virtue of the maturity extension of the official sector
loans coupled with very low interest rates on those credits, the official sector had
structurally subordinated itself to any new private sector lending that matured before
the official sector credits started to fall due. The buyers of these new bonds had
apparently persuaded themselves that the official sector either could not, or would
not, accelerate its loans and thus become an unexpected competitor for scarce Greek
financial resources in the interim1. The trick in the future will be to make a country
with a debt to GDP ratio in excess of 176% presentable to the markets without
inflicting an immediate, and politically unpalatable, nominal haircut on that debt
stock.
Legal Subordination (“Turn Over”)
Assuming that Grexit worries eventually recede, the official sector
lenders to Greece (apart from the IMF, which presumably will wish to stay out of
this) could consider formally subordinating their existing claims against Greece, on a
1

It strikes us as doubtful whether the private markets would again be prepared to accept only a de
facto, structural subordination of official sector debt before resuming lending to Greece. Following
Greece’s failure to make a payment to the IMF on June 30, 2015, the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) released a “Declaration of Default and Reservation of Rights” (July 3, 2015). This
Declaration noted that an Event of Default had occurred under the EFSF Public Sector Involvement -Liquidity Management Facility Agreement dated 1 March 2012 and stated:
The occurrence of an Event of Default under the PSI Facility Agreement
entitles the EFSF, by written notice to the Hellenic Republic, to cancel the
Facility and/or declare the aggregate principal amount of all Financial
Assistance Amounts made and outstanding thereunder to be immediately due
and payable, together with accrued interest. (emphasis added)
The EFSF stopped short of accelerating unmatured principal under this Facility, but expressly
reserved the right to do so. In light of this reminder of EFSF’s acceleration rights, we suspect private
sector lenders will now look for a legal -- not just a structural -- subordination as a condition to new
lending.
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targeted basis, to encourage new private sector lending to the country. Ideally, such
lending could displace some of the official sector borrowing contemplated by the
third bailout program. Perhaps more realistically, however, it could be used to
augment the resources available under that program without having to negotiate a
fourth bailout or to fund pro-growth initiatives not contemplated by the third
program.
Any such subordination would be targeted, meaning that the official
sector would need to approve both the terms and the general use of proceeds of any
new senior borrowing. This would not be a general subordination in favor of all
future private sector lending.
Subordination arrangements come in many forms but this one can be
straightforward. The subordination would require that if ever the new (senior)
private sector bonds fell into payment arrears, the official sector creditors would turn
over to the trustee acting for the bondholders such portion of the payments received
under official sector debt as may be necessary to cure the payment default on the
senior bonds. The subordination is not a guarantee: if at the time the official sector
loans are also in default, the official sector would be under no obligation to
indemnify the senior bondholders. The instrument of subordination would need to be
governed by the law of a non-EU country to avoid the risk of a subsequent EU
directive that undercuts the efficacy of the subordination. The debtor would be asked
to agree that any funds paid over to the senior creditors in this way would still be
owing to the official sector lenders.
Enhanced Structural Subordination
The alternative to a full legal subordination with a turn-over feature of
the kind described above would be enhanced structural subordination. Under this
approach the official sector would open a window (by deferring the maturity of its
own loans) into which new private sector lenders could advance credit without fear
of competing with official sector lenders when the time comes for repayment. To do
this effectively, however, the official sector would need voluntarily to forswear its
ability to accelerate the maturity of those loans, whatever the provocation. The
structured subordination could be further enhanced by a full debt service holiday on
official sector loans for a number of years or by setting the interest rate on those
loans very low during the window period. Although the new private sector lenders
would not have the comfort of knowing that any payments made to the official sector
lenders would have to be turned over to them in the event of a default, they could
take considerable comfort from the fact that little, if anything, would be due to the
official sector creditors during this period.
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The positions of the actors
The official sector lenders. Official sector lenders can be expected
initially to recoil at the word “subordination”. After all, these are the same countries
that claimed for themselves a preferred creditor status in the 2012 Treaty
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, second only to the preferred creditor
status of the IMF. They will see a voluntary subordination in favor of private sector
lenders as a long step down from that exalted perch. The charm of a targeted
subordination for the official sector -- its only charm -- lies in a sober assessment of
the alternatives: (i) lending the money itself with the near certainty that the funds
will not be recovered for many decades and a good chance that a portion will never
be recovered at all or (ii) immediately writing off a portion of existing official sector
loans in order to make the debtor country presentable to the market2.
The private market will impose its own discipline on sovereign
borrowers and will punish what it perceives as imprudent policies with an immediate
basis point penalty. All sovereign borrowers in the public markets are subject to
these forces. Although they may not substitute entirely for official sector prescribed
fiscal adjustment measures, market discipline can reinforce the debtor’s motivation
to pursue appropriate policies and perhaps occasionally avoid the need for the
official sector to use its heavy fist in enforcing compliance.
The official sector could analyze the situation as follows. There are
four possible outcomes were the official sector to subordinate its loans on a targeted
basis to new private sector lending:
2

The IMF staff’s latest assessment (released on July 14, 2015) notes that:
At the core of this conclusion [that the grace and repayment periods of
European official sector debts need to be doubled] is the fundamental
premise that public debt cannot be assumed to migrate back onto the balance
sheet of the private sector at interest rates consistent with debt sustainability
until debt is much lower. Greece cannot return to markets anytime soon at
interest rates that it can afford from a medium-term perspective. (emphasis
added)
If a debt writeoff is not on the (political) cards, the IMF staff concludes, a “very dramatic extension”
of the grace and repayment periods for Greece’s official sector (European) debt would be required.
This reflects the basic premise that debt cannot be assumed to migrate back
onto the balance sheet of the private sector at interest rates close to the
current AAA rates before debt levels have been brought to much lower
levels; borrowing at anything but AAA rates in the near term will bring about
an unsustainable debt dynamic for the next several decades. (emphasis
added)
IMF Country Report 15/186, Greece: An Update of IMF Staff’s Preliminary Public Debt
Sustainability Analysis (released July 14, 2015).

4
[NEWYORK 3087808_4]

(i)

Greece pays in full both its official sector and private sector
debts.

(ii)

Greece defaults on both its official sector and private sector
debts.

(iii) Greece pays its official sector lenders but defaults on the new
(senior) private sector loans.
(iv) Greece pays its private sector lenders but defaults on its official
sector debt.
In both scenarios (i) and (ii) the official sector is a big winner. It will
have encouraged new private sector loans -- and thereby displaced the need for
additional official sector exposure -- at no cost to itself. This is especially true in
scenario (ii) where the defaults occur across the board and would have fallen on the
official sector had it lent the additional money itself.
In scenario (iii) the official sector (assuming a full legal
subordination) would be obliged to turn over a portion of the funds they receive to
cover a default on the senior private sector debt. But that will simply result in those
turned-over amounts still being due to the official sector and the whole premise of
this scenario is that Greece has decided to continue paying its official sector debt in
full.
Scenario (iv) would not require the official sector to turn over any
funds to the private sector. The official sector lenders are only prejudiced in this
scenario if the size of the new senior private sector debts has grown so large that they
consume resources that would otherwise have been used to pay official sector debts.
Of course, that same strain on resources would presumably also have been present
had the new loans come from the official sector in the first place.
The private sector lenders. A prospective private sector lender
benefiting from the subordination should view Greece as effectively shriven of the
vast majority of its outstanding debt. The official sector debt will still be there, of
course, but the terms of the subordination should ensure that the official sector
lenders will not be competitors for scarce resources if ever Greece finds itself unable
to pay both its senior private debt and its official sector creditors. Outstanding Greek
Government bonds now total about €37.7 billion; IMF credits add about €21.4 billion
(for a total of €59.1 billion). No subordination would be sought from these lenders.
If the other official sector debt is expunged from the Greek balance sheet for credit
analysis purposes, this would be equivalent to lending to a Eurozone member with a
debt to GDP of less than 35%.
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Greece. Reaccessing the private capital markets, even under cover of
a targeted subordination of existing claims, would begin to wean Greece from its
status as a ward of the official sector. It would convey a measure of independence,
perhaps a measure of dignity, in the public eye.
It would not, however, be costless. The markets will lend to Greece at
higher interest rates and shorter tenors than Greece’s official sector loans. Moreover,
the private lenders will expect to be repaid at maturity and will not hesitate to pursue
their legal remedies if they are not. On balance, all of this may be salutary. The
principal brake on excessive sovereign borrowing is the realization that the money
must eventually be repaid. As noted above, the markets exact their own discipline on
sovereign debtors -- all sovereign debtors -- and it is altogether healthy that they do
so.
Conclusion
Encouraging private sector lending to Greece through a targeted
subordination of official sector debt achieves certain objectives but not others. It will
not obviate the need for additional official sector financial assistance; even in the
best case, private lending could displace only a small portion of the needed official
sector loans. It will not avoid the need for additional fiscal adjustment in Greece; the
markets would demand it even if the official sector did not. And it will not eliminate
the eventual need for official sector debt relief although it may help to deflect radical
forms of debt relief like nominal haircuts until a more politically auspicious moment.
Finally, no amount of subordination will induce new private sector lending at
tolerable interest rates until the risk of a Greek exit from the Eurozone subsides.
Between May 2010 and March 2012 (when Greece executed a
restructuring of what remained of its bond indebtedness), the official sector allowed
Greece’s private sector creditors to exit a distressed situation entirely unscathed.
Those liabilities migrated, at par, from the hands of the people who lent the money
into the hands of taxpayer-funded official sector creditors. It was a policy now
almost universally regretted. Encouraging private capital flows back into Greece
should be a priority of the official sector.
*

*

*
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